The risk of foreign interference in your research is real. Both Danish and foreign intelligence services warn that suspicious actors are unlawfully attempting to gain access to knowledge about technology and products that are important for Denmark’s competitiveness. The threat comes primarily from Russia, China and Iran, but there are also cases of other states conducting intelligence activities in Denmark.
How do foreign intelligence services spy on us?
Foreign intelligence services also make extensive use of cyber attacks to try to gain access to information from Danish authorities, educational institutions, companies and private individuals. In many ways, cyber espionage is an attractive approach, as it is low risk and can often be carried out from the home country without leaving a visible trace.
Foreign intelligence services include intelligence officers, who often work in the guise of diplomats, journalists or researchers and are trained to select and build contact with individuals who can typically provide them with access to classified and sensitive information.
Foreign intelligence services are also continuously developing their capacity to intercept telecommunication and data traffic. These capacities include monitoring electronic communications, ranging from mobile phone calls, text messages and emails to radio communications.
Consequences of espionage
Future funding will be difficult if it is rumoured that your research has been stolen by a foreign state. You can also suffer financial loss if someone gains access to data or information owned by your funding sources.
Financial dependency brings the risk of financial extortion. Direct or indirect threats to withdraw funding for a project can exert pressure that compromises academic freedom or freedom of communication and expression.
The ability to be credited for your work or to have your research published is limited if there is a loss of research results
The credibility of your research risks being destroyed if data worthy of protection is stolen or misused.
You can read more about the consequences of espionage in the UFM Publication here (in Danish):
On social media, for example, an intelligence officer can often find information about a person’s work, family situation, hobbies or similar. The intelligence officer can use this knowledge to initiate contact with a person who may be of interest to recruit as a source.