Foreign intelligence services may be interested in you, your knowledge and/or your research. It is typically easier to access these when you are away from home. Therefore, it is important that you consider whether your research is particularly vulnerable, who your collaboration partners are and that you are aware that there is a threat.
Before your trip
PET specifies that the intelligence activities of foreign states have continuous focus on high-tech and defence policy areas. This applies in particular to energy technology, biotechnology, quantum technology, space technology, robot technology, defence industry products and products subject to export controls. However, in line with global developments, there is constant variability in which research areas are particularly vulnerable, and a number of research areas and products can be used for both civilian and military purposes, so-called dual-use, which adds to the complexity of the issue.
Consider your research area, data, equipment and results that are strategically important to SDU and thus vulnerable. If your research area is particularly vulnerable, make an assessment of whether these areas, equipment, data and results are adequately protected, and be extra cautious about which collaborative relationships are entered into in the area. Also, continuously consider what relevant terms and conditions are included in the collaboration agreement and consider whether additional measures are needed along the way.
Be critical of unknown partners and make sure to report any suspicions to SDU’s information security manager at ciso-sdu@sdu.dk. Do a background check on your collaboration partners. Do the publications, universities and workplaces they are associated with exist? Can their work be verified by others? Carefully consider whether the likelihood of added value is greatest in the collaboration with the partner in question and whether there are equal and compatible interests in the collaboration. Include positive and negative lists that provide an overview of which specific technologies, data, equipment, results, etc. are being shared and to which the partners have access.
Bring only the essentials. Information and equipment that you leave at home cannot be accessed by foreign intelligence services.
Assess the risk. The risk depends on issues such as your knowledge, your contacts and your destination. By and large, there is a risk as soon as you leave the workplace, but there is a difference between travelling to Moscow or to Randers. Contact the Service Desk or SDU Digital Compliance if in doubt.
During your journey
Keep track of your belongings. When travelling, it is easy to lose track of and control over the most important things. This is especially true at the airport, at the hotel, on the metro and in the conference hall. For example, bring sensitive material as hand luggage instead of checking it in with your suitcase.
Think about your behaviour. Avoid putting yourself in a situation that could be used to blackmail you later. It is always better to travel in groups rather than alone.
After your journey
Evaluate the trip with your travelling companions. Did anything suspicious or risky happen? Have you been contacted unexpectedly after returning home? Report it to SDU’s information security manager at ciso-sdu@sdu.dk
Read more on PETs website and in the URIS report (in danish).